Text Assist for Suspect Classes Flowchart


Legislations Restricting Political Processes:
In Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Justice Stone said that the Supreme Court will not interfere with State legislation unless it is to protect people who are either structurally or functionally barred or restricted from the political process. For example, a law may simply prohibit a class from voting or society may set up barriers to entry into the politcal process that are specifically targeted and intended to burden the group. Either these groups of people are physically barred from participating inThis. This class may have been actually discouraged from voting (and although such actions are illegal now, the legacy of this discrimination (the stigma of inferiority) may have remained in the culture). Furthermore, if the group iv very small, the members of the class will believe that is it pointless to vote their vote is not sufficient to alter the outcome.


Political Processes can Ordinarily be Expected to Bring About Repeal of Undesirable Legislation:
The Supreme Court is not interested in dealing with those that are on the losing side of the political process because these individuals, at least, had the opportunity to participate. The fact that the individuals lost does not grant them a review by the Court. Footnote 4 specifically applies to those individuals who never even had the chance to "play".
.


Those Legislations that Affect the Politically Powerless are Subject to Higher Judicial Scrutiny:
The Supreme Court has a duty to interpret the Constitution and to deal with only the constitutionally important issues. Justice Stone said that, in general, the Supreme Court will give the highest level of deference to the review of State legislation (i.e. Rational Basis review), except in those instances where the legislation hinders or burdens the rights of minorities or others belonging to suspect classes which cannot turn to the political process to rectify the injustce. In cases where the legislations directly target or ahve a disparate affect on a suspect class, the Supreme Court uses the "Strict Scrutiny" standard of review.


Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court is looking for a Compelling State Interest and the Necessary Means to accomplish the goal that the State set. The fit between the Interest that the State has and the Means that the State uses to fulfill the Interest must be very tight in order to survive this scrutiny. Usually, the standard is so high that few legislation survive the scrutiny.

In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1976) , the Supreme Court examines a law preventing interracial marriages. Virginia claims that the law is not discriminatory because both parties (black and white) are equally punished. However, the Court determines that the true effect of this law is to keep non-whites from marrying whites. The only possible interest that a state can have in this law is to promote white supremacy and racial purity; interests that cannot be described as compelling. Since there are no compelling interests involved, there is no need to proceed to the necessary means part of the test. established the rule that any legislation based on racial classification will be subject to the highest standard of review (i.e. Strict Scrutiny).


Prejudice Against a Discrete and Insular Minority:
Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886) was, facially, a race neutral law that required a special permit to operate a laundry business in a wooden structure, a type of business that many Chinese people engaged in. However, while both white and Chinese people applied for the license, all the white people received the license and none of the Chinese applicants did. The Chinese people were clearly the subject of prejudice and discrimination on the basis of their race, a factor that they were unable to alter.

The phrase, "Discrete and Insular" implies that the characteristics defining the group cannot be easily changed and that there is no easy entrance into or egress from the group. Hernandes v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), made it clear that the protection in the Fourteenth Amendment applied to people of Mexican descent and by extension to all minority groups who are singled out, "...for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification..." Thus, it is unconstitutional to discriminate against any Suspect Class (i.e. memebers of any specific race or religion).


Curtailing of the Political Process:
Historically, various minorities have been discriminated against in many ways, including being denied the opportunity to participate in the political process. Although today, it is illegal to discriminate, the legacy remains, and many individuals who belong to minority groups, may still feel inferior and believe that their vote and participation is unimportant and will not change anything. The reality is that although the laws have changed, the attitudes have not and there is still an institutional insensitivity to the needs of the minorities in the population,

In Palmer v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the only reason that a state court considered removing a child from the custody of the mother is because the mother's new fiance was black. The judge in this case noted that the child would suffer social stigma because of her interracial family, demonstrating the society's lingering bias as well as the prejudice in the judicial system when it considered making a custody change based on race alone.

Such continuous pattern of disparate treatment deeply and seriously affects the ability and the desire of the minority to participate in the political process. The long history of discrimination against the members of the suspect class, the remains of which still persist today, may act to further their feelings of inferiority, animosity, and a general desire to be removed from the process that injures them without permitting them the opportunity to redress the wrongs.


When the Political Process Designed to Protect Minorities Fails, the Supreme Court Must Step In:
Before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), African American students were segregated from white students in separate ans supposedly equal school systems. The Supreme Court determined that this treatment was clearly discriminatory toward the black children and that it worked to instill the feelings of inferiority in them. Furthermore, it can be argued that the African American population wanted to change the segregation laws, but were unable to do so because, as a group, the African Americans were relatively politically powerless. Not only was there a history of keeping the African American from voting, as is his or her right, but there simply were not enough African AMericans of voting age to vote in a legislation mandating desegregation. In order to rectify this situation, the Supreme Court examined this case, determined that the laws calling for segregation were unconstitutional and instigated the changes. In effect, the Supreme Court did what the African American population would have done if they had not been so effectively barred from the political process.


Statutes Specifically Directed at a Particular Religious, National or Racial Minority are Reviewed Using Strict Scrutiny:
The legislation in question may actually list race as a classification (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1976) ) or have a discriminatory effect (i.e. facially, the legislation does not use race as a classification, but the enforcement of the statute results in disparate treatment for a discrete and insular group of people) as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886).


Identifying the Suspect Class:
There are four Indicia of Suspectedness that can be used to determine if a group is a suspect class. If all four of the indicia are satisfied, the group is, in fact a suspect class (i.e. African Americans). If only some of the criteria are met, then the group may be a Quasi-Suspect Class (i.e. Women). The four prongs for determining a suspect class are discussed in detail below.


History of Purposeful Discrimination:
Racial or religious minorities may have been given little or no chance to succeed in society. Barriers preventing full participation included limiting education for African Americans and women (partially because of the belief that neither group was capable of learning and were so worthless as human beings as not merit the expenditure of time and effort to educate them) and then passing laws prohibiting voting. The discrimination in these types of cases is intentional and those doing the discriminating are doing it for the purpose of limiting the groups access to and effect on society in general. The stigma of inferiority that has been imposed on the members of suspect classes by society may become a self-fulfilling prophesy and the groups will begin to accept society's view of them as true and valid, perpetuating the vicious circle of helplessness and social disdain.


Political Powerlessness:
Individuals belonging to the suspect classes are either structurally or functionally excluded from the process. The history of previous discrimination, historical lack of education, and the entrenched feelings that their votes will not count, has created a situation where minorities and women are reluctant to vote or run for office. These barriers are very significant. Although there are many laws that guarantee women and minorities all the rights guaranteed to white men, there are still very few women and minorities in high positions in the government. Furthermore, it is much more difficult to mobilize women or minorities to vote.


Immutable Trait:

There is no way to change the distinguishing characteristic that places the individual into the suspect or quasi-suspect class. Another way to see this is that there is no free entry into and egress this group. This is the difference between race or gender which cannot be easily changed and a characteristic like wealth, which, at least theoretically, can be altered (Note: Wealth is not a suspect class unless it is a proxy for race, alienage, or another suspect class).


Grossly Unfair:
Is the discrimination or disparate effect of a facially nondiscriminatory law so egregious as to offend common precepts of decency?


End of Text Assist