Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
  Advanced Search  
Contact Us Directory Jobs@LLS Site Map LMU
Home Prospective Students Current Students Faculty & Staff Alumni & Friends
Girardi
Spring 2006 Courses - Constitutional Law I - Manheim

Questions & Answers<April 4, 2008 April 4, 2008


Late-breaking Qs & As (uncategorized) <click here>

Posted below are questions of general interest that I receive from students (usually by email). If my answers are any good, they're posted here too.  In addition, you might want to look at previous Q&A pages. If you understand all the questions and all the answers, you'll ace the course.


Judicial Review
Federalism Separation of Powers Miscellany

Supreme Court Review

Q.  For the A & I State Groud doctrine, what is the "independent" requirement? Is it that the state has to interpret its const differently from the US const?

A. Not differently; just independently. State law and federal law can be harmonious, so long as state law isn't tied to federal law (dependent upon federal law for its interpretation)

 


Standing

Q. What is the Private Attn General Theory?

A. The AG enforces public (as opposed to private) rights. When individuals sue to enforce public rights, they are acting as "private AGs"). Lujan is a good example of this, where congress provided for "citizen suits" to enforce the legal obligations of the executive department. As you can see after Chadha, Congress cannot itself review the actions of executive agencies; citizen suits were an effort to have the courts do that. By closing both doors (legislative veto and private AG actions) the S.Ct. has made it more difficult to check abuses by the executive.

 

Q. How would you define the jus tertii standing exception of an overriding policy desire to vindicate rights? I'm having trouble figuring out what that means exactly. Does it mean that certain plaintiffs have standing under this exception if they are trying to enforce someone else's constitutional rights (i.e. Craig v. Boren)? Any guidance you could give would be most appreciated.

A. The best example of this is jus tertii standing in first amendment cases. Example: a vagrancy ordinance that prohibits groups of people congregating on the street (Coates v. Cincinnati - you'll read it in Con Law 2). Even if the claimant is not engaged in a protected speech activity, she can raise the rights of persons whose speech (e.g., protests) is affected by the vagrancy ordinance. That is because the right to free speech is considered so valuable as to justify a policy exception to the focus prong (prong 4), which is itself a judicially-made policy rule.


10th Amendment

Q. How do you reconcile Condon v. Reno and Printz v. United States?

A. Condon is an instance of 10th Am. version 2; Printz is version 3.  In Condon, the feds did not impose any enforcement obligations on the states; only compliance obligations.  In other words, to the extent states kept motor vehicle and license information, they had to follow federal privacy standards.  There was no requirement that the states enforce the federal standards against 3d parties.


11th Amendment

 

Q. The 11th Amendment flowchart states that failure to assert immunity could constitute a state waiver. I don't remember discussing this in
class, so I was wondering if you might be able to provide an example. Is this akin to a defendant waiving any objections to personal
jurisdiction because they fail to bring a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss? (i.e. must a State defendant make a timely objection in federal court,
stating that they are immune from suit under the 11th Amd)?

A. Yes, states can consent to be sued in federal court. This usually requires an explicit legislative waiver, but if the state fails to raise the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity, the court will not raise it sua sponte.


Preemption

Q. Is there a difference between preclusion and express (exclusive) preemption?

A. Yes, preclusion is preemption by self-executing restrictions on state action found in the constitution (whether or not congress acts).   Preemption of any kind requires cong'l action first.


Commerce Clause

Q. Are channels/instruments of interstate commerce areas where only the federal government can regulate?  Or can congress consent to a state's regulation of these areas (such as in the License cases)?

A.Congress can delegate its power to the states unless there  are prohibitions on states acting in the area (see Art. I s. 10).


Q. Is the Wilburn test built into the Lopez test?

A. Yes.  Local effects substantially affecting interstate commerce -  part 1: economic activity


Q. What is the standard of review used under the Lopez test?  I know it's not rational basis (at least under Marshall's view) nor is it strict scrutiny...so is it akin to the middle-ground approach or is it the middle-ground approach?

A. It is heightened (although not strict) scrutiny.  Any test that looks  at "substantial relationships" or affects is a sort of mid-level test.

Q. In terms of the Lopez test and the congressional findings element, do the congressional findings only have to survive the rational basis test? ( i.e.no rational person could find as congress did for the Ct to be able to ignore congress's findings?) I have in my notes that the USSC is free to ignore congressional findings but then I also have that the USSC is only supposed to determine if congress's findings were rational.

A. Lopez replaced the Rational Basis test of McCulloch v. Maryland with a far less deferential test. Now, rather than accept Congress' findings of why a particular law is necessary to promote one of congress' enumerated powers, the Court makes that determination itself (of course, without the help of hearings or political judgment).

 
Q. Does Gregory v Ashcroft apply to all federal laws that purport to regulate states, meaning that if a federal law intends to be applicable to states it must clearly say so, regardless of which power it enacted under?

A. Yes, at least wherever the state sovereignty is being compromised by the enforcement of federal law against them (thus, perhaps not if the federal law implements a treaty).

 


Dormant Commerce Clause

Q.  What are the factors we look at to see if a state law is a direct regulation of commerce? I think two of them are 1) does law discriminate against IC; 2) Is law protectionist?

A. Discriminatory state laws can be viewed as direct regulation, but I prefer to leave them in a separate category altogether. Direct regulation includes: a) regulation of interstate competition (Buck v. Kykendall); b) regulation of business entry (ability of out-state firms to do business in state) (City of Carbone); and c) extraterritorial effects (state law regulating activities in other states) (Baldwin v. GAF Selig)

 

Q.  Is a state law that unintentionally discriminates against interstate commerce always valid under a DCC analysis, or does it 
still have to go through the same balancing analysis under prong three of the Pike test?

A. Unintentional discrimination is simply not treated as discriminatory under the DCC. But even non-discriminatory laws can fail the balancing prong.

 


Section 5

 


Court Stripping

Q. What exactly are the statutory limits on the Supreme Courts Jdx? and what is court stripping? Is that just when Congress takes away SCrt's ability to hear certain cases but the Court still has the pwr to est. their own jdx & make sure Cong is acting in accord w/Constitution?

A. Congress has the power to create inferior federal courts, and the power to determine the S.Ct.'s appellate jurisdiction.  It exercises those powers by enacting statutes that confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.  Congress can confer jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by Article III, or to some lesser degree. (It can't confer jurisdiction beyond that permitted by Art. III - Marbury).

Congress often confers less jurisdiction than constitutionally permitted.  For instance, the requirement of complete diversity in Sec. 1332 is not required by Art. III; the constitution would permit minimal diversity.  When congress repeals previously granted jurisdiction, that is known as court stripping. 

Court stripping does not usually pose constitutional problems (congress, after all, has enumerated power to do so).  But, when congress removes jurisdiction in particular categories of cases (for instance, the recently enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 denies habeas corpus jurisdiction over Guantanamo prisoners), or in an effort to prevent judicial review of controversial legislation, it may interfere with the federal courts' ability to perform their constitutionally-assigned functions.  A statute that strips federal courts of jurisdiction in such a manner as to interfere with their "essential functions" may violate Separation of Powers.

Q. What are external and internal restrictions on Congress's power to limit jdx. Which are in the constitution? Along these lines, what type of restriction is SoP?

A. I use the distinction between internal and external limits merely as a convenient way to think about constitutional restrictions; there's no meaningful difference. An internal limit on power is one found in the same clause (or section or article) that confers power in the first place. Thus, while Art III, confers "judicial power" on federal courts, Section 2 limits that power to 9 enumerated subject areas. In this sense, an internal limit can be seen merely as a more precise statement of the power conferred (e.g., Art. I, Sec 8 gives congress the power to tax and spend, but only for the common defence and general welfare). External limits, on the other hand, are found outside the power conferring clause. The bill of rights limits the powers of the federal gov't. Since these limits are not part of the power grant, I call them "external." An external limit can be explicit (e.g., 1st amd) or implicit (e.g., federalism or separatioin of powers)

 


War & Treaty Powers

Q. What effect does the 3rd Version of the Tenth Amendment have on regulation under the war and treaty powers?  I am particularly unsure whether the anti-commandeering principles apply in this situation, particularly because in Curtiss-Wright and many other cases, they would dismiss Tenth Amendment arguments rather quickly.

A. very good question; no answer (yet).  when it comes to foreign  affairs, state lines disappear, so it wouldn't seem that  commandeering state officials would be much of a problem.  there in  fact may be some commandeering going on in the war on terrorism  (alert systems, emergency preparedness, police activities).  Still, no court has answered your question.

 

 

Q. Are treaties that are followed by domestic legislation (i.e. Migratory Bird Treaty Act) subject to the same strictures of the 10th
Amendment analysis as federal statutes enacted under congress' Art. I, section 8 enumerated powers?

A. Yes, but remember that the treaty is itself a source of power for congress. So the MBTA had to be a necessary & proper means to promote the MBT. Historically at least, the Ct. has used rational basis in making this assessment.


Tax & Spend Powers

Q. In the third prong of the conditional grant test (the Conditions on the Grants Must Relate to the Grant’s Purpose), is the standard of review strict scrutiny whereas the standard of review for what constitutes the general welfare is still basically rational basis?

A. The standard used to determine if a condition is justified by the grant's purpose is substantial relationship.  Note how Rehnquist and O'Connor disagreed on just how substantial the relationship needed to be in S.Dak v. Dole.

Q. Under the unconstitutional conditions test, is the standard of review strict scrutiny as well?

A. No, it is substantial relationship


Executive Privilege

 


Adequate & Independent State Grounds Doctrine

 


Privileges & Immunities

 


Justiciability

.


Miscellany

 

 


Non-Delegation Doctrine

 


Executive Orders